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OPSOMMING
Geregtelike benaderings tot swangerskap: ’n Relasionele respons op die 
huidige Suid-Afrikaanse posisie en onlangse akademiese denkrigtings
Hierdie artikel neem drie verskillende geregtelike benaderings tot
swangerskap in oënskou en oorweeg die onderskeie aansprake om
ongeborenes tot geboorte te beskerm. Die benaderings wat ondersoek
word is die enkel-entiteitbenadering, die aparte-entiteite benadering en
die nie-een-nie-maar-nie-twee-nie benadering. Daar is tekortkominge in
beide die enkel-entiteit en die aparte-entiteite benaderings. Beide
benaderings faal daarin om die relasionele karakter van swangerskap te
akkommodeer aangesien ongeborenes beskou word as nie-entiteite tot
voordeel van swanger vrouens of swanger vrouens se belange opsy
geskuif word tot voordeel van ongeborenes. Die artikel gaan verder om die
nadelige implikasies van hierdie twee benaderings te beklemtoon en voor
te stel dat ’n relasionele benadering tot swangerskap opgeneem en gevolg
word. Hierdie benadering word beliggaam in die nie-een-nie-maar-nie-
twee-nie benadering en steun op die verhouding tussen swanger vrouens
en ongeborenes om sodoende die waarde van beide die entiteite wat ’n
swangerskap opmaak, te erken. Die nie-een-nie-maar-nie-twee-nie
benadering lê tussen die twee uiterste benaderings van die enkel-entiteit
benadering en die aparte-entiteite benadering. Die voorstel beliggaam in
hierdie benadering is dat die waarde van ongeborenes erken moet word
maar wel in verhouding tot swanger vrouens wat die ongeborenes dra. Die
artikel bekyk die definisie van die nie-een-nie-maar-nie-twee-nie
benadering, die skakels met relasionele feminisme en die moontlike
toepassing daarvan in ’n Suid-Afrikaanse konteks. Die artikel benadruk dat
regsprobleme wat ten opsigte van swangerskap, swanger vrouens of
ongeborenes ontstaan, benader behoort te word vanuit die vertrekpunt
van die geleefde en beliggaamde ervarings van swangerskap om sodoende
die pad vorentoe te bepaal.
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1 Introduction
This article identifies and examines three approaches that can be
adopted in law when dealing with issues relevant to pregnancy, pregnant
women and the unborn, and considers the appropriateness of each
approach in respect of its aim of securing positive pregnancy outcomes
and specifically protection of the unborn until birth. The three
approaches discussed are the single-entity approach, the separate-
entities approach, and the not-one-but-not-two approach (not one/not
two). The article recognises that all authors referred to herein, as well as
the author of the present article, seek to develop a model that can
accommodate legitimate protection of the unborn in law. However, while
the intentions of all concerned are the same, the approaches differ.
Contrary to the approaches adopted by the authors discussed herein, this
article seeks to emphasise that any issue in law that relates to pregnancy,
pregnant women and the unborn must be approached in such a way that
the reality of pregnancy, being one of embodied relationship, informs the
debates going forward.
What the article shows is that South African law primarily adopts the
single-entity approach to pregnancy. This approach entails viewing
pregnant women as single entities, thus making the unborn non-entities
under the law. However, this article highlights that there has been a
noticeable trend in academic publications towards distinguishing the
unborn from the pregnant women who carry them, and the unborn are
singled out as entities in need of the law’s direct protection. On the basis
of scientific evidence, the unborn are individuated from pregnant
women, thus justifying the call for the law’s recognition of their
independent status, either as legal persons or as a subcategory of legal
subjects. Academics whose work is considered in this article maintain
that the law’s independent recognition of the unborn will better equip the
law to protect them, thereby securing more positive pregnancy
outcomes. These arguments speak to a separate-entities approach to
pregnancy.
It is shown that the separate-entities approach is continuously being
advanced despite the fact that the unborn exist and live entirely in and
off pregnant women’s bodies. The bodies that the unborn live off of
belong to other legal persons, being pregnant women who are legal
subjects with vested constitutional rights and duties of their own. This
article takes the stance that both the single-entity and separate-entities
approaches are an inadequate response to pregnancy under the law. In
this respect, the article thus proceeds to consider, with approval, the not-
one/-not-two approach to pregnancy. It is demonstrated that this
approach is rooted in relational feminism and is context-driven, in that it
draws on women’s perspectives of pregnancy. The not one/not two
approach recognises the relationship that exists between pregnant
women and foetuses during pregnancy, thus allowing space to value the
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unborn – but only in relation to the pregnant women carrying them and
only in so far as this recognition advances women’s rights.
The article first examines the current position with regard to
pregnancy under South African law. Thereafter, a number of South
African authors’ positions will be considered in so far as they argue for a
revised approach to pregnancy. Their revised approach will be tested
against relevant legal principles in order to determine whether such an
approach in fact offers the protection envisaged. Finally, the article will
draw on the not one/not two approach as a preferred approach to
pregnancy.
2 Current Position of the Unborn in South 
Africa: The Single-entity Approach to 
Pregnancy
There is no known legislation that explicitly recognises the unborn as
independent entities in South African law. In most instances, a child is
defined as being below the age of majority, without specifying when that
age begins. An example of this approach is to be found in section 28(3)
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which states
that a “child”, for purposes of section 28, means a person under the age
of eighteen years.1 Neither “age” nor “person” is defined, particularly in
respect of when either begins or comes into being. While legislation does
not expressly deny the unborn independent status, the common law
does. Presently, the common law “born-alive” rule denies the unborn
legal status and the title of “person”.2 Unless legislation specifically
trumps the common law position or the common law is developed
through judicial precedent, any law applicable to persons therefore
excludes those not yet born.3
The extent of the unborn’s status as a non-entity in view of the born-
alive rule is significantly obvious when one considers the recent criminal
law decision in S v Makhakha.4 In this case, a woman who was about
seven months’ pregnant was one of the victims of a brutal rape and
murder. While the accused was found guilty of the pregnant victim’s rape
1 The Children’s Act 38 of 2005 takes the same approach: see s 1(1)
definitions.
2 Boezaart “Child law, the child and South African private law” in Boezaart
(ed) Child Law in South Africa (ed Boezaart) (2009) 4. Here “person” is used
in terms of its legal construction, rather than its social construction. The
distinction between the two constructions can be found in Lupton The
Social Worlds of the Unborn (2013).
3 Botha explains that it is presumed that legislation does not alter the
common law more than is necessary, where it does, legislation will trump
the common law. However, where there is no legislation dealing with the
issue specifically, the common law position stands. See Botha Statutory
Interpretation: An Introduction for Students (2012) 43.
4 2013 JDR 1934 (WCC).
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and murder, the fact that a viable foetus was lost during the commission
of the crime was not regarded as an issue worthy of the High Court’s
attention.5
Makhakha is noteworthy for purposes of this article because it
demonstrates how deep-rooted South African law’s perception is of
pregnancy, that is, the law views pregnancy as a representation of
pregnant women embodying a single entity. Seymour, with reference to
the United States of America (USA), Canada and Australia, explains that
this is the “body-part model” of pregnancy under the law.6 The single-
entity approach means that “the fetus is simply part of the woman’s
body” and thus denies the unborn its “distinctiveness”.7 The unborn is
seen to be part of a woman’s body in the same way that a room is part
of a house; hence it is merely something akin to an organ that belongs to
the body of a pregnant woman.8 Consequently, the single-entity
approach withholds any vested and protectable interests or rights for as
long as foetuses remain unborn. 9
Succinctly stated, the South African legal position is that a person is
one who is born alive and in whom legal subjectivity vests only at this
moment.10 Boezaart defines a legal subject as “any entity that can have
rights, duties and competencies”.11 Further, “legal subjectivity” is
defined as “the characteristic of being a legal subject in legal
interaction”.12 Consequently, as our law stands in respect of legal status,
it appears that foetuses are distinguishable from the women carrying
them (and all other live-born persons) in that they lack legal subjectivity.
However, as will appear below, this position is now being challenged,
because it is progressively being accepted that the unborn are not mere
maternal tissue or non-entities.
3 Towards a Separate-entities Approach 
Emphasising Foetal Individuation
One way to emphasise that something “more” than only a woman is
present during pregnancy is to rely on science and medical technology.
5 The judgment as reported does not include the sentence imposed and it is
therefore not clear if the loss of foetal life even contributed to an increased
sentence as a possible aggravating factor.
6 Seymour Childbirth and the Law (2000) 189.
7 Idem 190.
8 Ibid.
9 This position has been confirmed in a number of decided cases: Pinchin v
Santam Insurance 1963 2 SA 254 (W); Christian League of Southern Africa v
Rall 1981 2 SA 821 (O); Van Heerden v Joubert 1994 4 739 (A); Friedman v
Glicksman 1996 1 SA 1134 (W); Christian Lawyers of SA v Minister of Health
1998 4 SA 1113 (T); Road Accident Fund v Mtati 2005 6 SA 215 (SCA) and S v
Mshumpa 2008 1 SACR 126 (E).
10 Boezaart 4.
11 Ibid.
12 Kruger & Skelton (eds) The Law of Persons in South Africa (2010) 13.
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Science tells us that there is life before birth and that this life, even though
in the process of development, is genetically unique and constitutes
more than mere maternal tissue.13 The separate-entities approach draws
on these findings and emphasises that the unborn are distinct entities.
In this respect, the single-entity approach can be contrasted with the
separate-entities approach. Seymour explains that the separate-entities
approach to pregnancy views women and foetuses as if they were
separate individuals of distinctive value with separable needs.14 In their
separate existence, pregnant women and the unborn are seen to possess
a range of enforceable rights or interests,15 ultimately leading to an
understanding that the foetus is able to engage directly in legal relations
for its own account, obviously not in its personal capacity but through
third parties. It is generally contended that this approach is necessary to
allow the law to better protect the unborn.
The separate-entities approach is viewed favourably by a number of
South African academics.16 In some instances, authors adopt a separate-
entities approach as a mechanism to extend personhood and rights,17
while others avoid a rights approach and develop a form of quasi-legal
subject in respect of the unborn.18 “Quasi-legal subject” is used here
because, even though some authors denounce a rights approach to
protecting the unborn, they still argue for direct application of legal
principles to the unborn.19 If one considers the meaning of legal
subjectivity as including an element of legal interaction with a subject,20
these authors have essentially gone on to argue for a subcategory of legal
subjectivity.
13 Seymour 194; Palmer “Seeing and knowing: Ultrasound images in the
contemporary abortion debate” 2009 Feminist Theory 173; Duden “The
fetus on the ‘farther shore’: Toward a history of the unborn” in Morgan &
Michaels (eds) Fetal Subjects, Feminist Positions (1999) 13; Casper
“Operation to the rescue: Feminist encounters with fetal surgery” in Fetal
Subjects, Feminist Positions 101 (Morgan & Michaels).
14 Seymour 190, 194.
15 Idem 194.
16 Du Plessis “Feticide: Creating a statutory crime in South African law” 2013
Stel LR 73; Jordaan “The legal validity of an advance refusal of medical
treatment in South African law (Part 1)” 2011 44(1) De Jure 32; Ovens “A
criminological perspective on the prenatal abuse of substances during
pregnancy and the link to child abuse in South Africa” 2010 Child Abuse
Research: A South African Journal 38; Pillay “The beginning of human
personhood: Is South African law outdated?” 2010 Stel LR 230; De Freitas &
Myburgh “The relevance of science for the protection of the unborn” 2009
Journal for Christian Scholarship 61; & Kruuse “Fetal ‘rights’? The need for a
unified approach to the fetus in the context of feticide” 2009 THRHR 126.
17 Ovens 2010 Child Abuse Research: A South African Journal 38 & Pillay 2010
Stel LR 230.
18 Du Plessis 2013 Stel LR 73; Jordaan 2011 44(1) De Jure 32; De Freitas &
Myburgh 2009 Journal for Christian Scholarship 61 & Kruuse 2009 THRHR
126.
19 Ibid. The authors’ arguments will be discussed further in para 3 1.
20 Boezaart 4.
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In essence, the separate-entities approach is used as a means to justify
the call for individualised legal protection. Some authors call for
protection from third parties,21 while others call for protection from the
pregnant women who carry the unborn.22 The relevant issue, however,
is to understand the approach adopted by the various authors rather than
focusing on the individual arguments necessitating this approach.
Therefore, the merits of the arguments mentioned will not be engaged.
This article will consider both the issue of advancing personhood and
of developing quasi-legal subjectivity. However, the main focus will fall
on those positions that employ the separate-entities approach as a
ground to extend personhood and rights, the intention being to
determine whether this reframed approach to pregnancy effectively
offers the protection that the authors concerned expect. The article will
then go on to reject the separate-entities approach in its entirety and, in
that discussion, also dismiss the issue of quasi-legal subjectivity.
3 1 Separate-entities Approach as a Basis for Quasi-Legal 
Subjectivity
According to S v Mshumpa, the common law crime of murder does not
extend to the unborn.23 The court thus confirmed that the victim must
have been a living person at the time of the murder.24 It further found
that, where a pregnancy is terminated as a result of third-party violence,
it is not the murder of the foetus that is at issue, but rather, as a result of
their “unique togetherness”, an assault on or attempted murder of the
pregnant woman.25
There are two academic responses to this case. In each, the authors
grapple with the idea of criminalising the termination of a pregnancy as
a result of the infliction of violence by a third party. Du Plessis, interprets
Mshumpa as offering indirect protection to the unborn and rejects such
an approach as being insufficient.26 Instead, Du Plessis advocates for a
statutory crime of feticide and calls for the recognition of the unborn,
from conception onwards, as potential victims of violent crime in their
own right.27 She discredits personhood as being necessary for protection
in law and suggests moving beyond a rights discourse when debating
21 Du Plessis 2013 Stel LR 73 & Kruuse 2009 THRHR 126.
22 Jordaan 2011 44(1) De Jure 32 & Ovens 2010 Child Abuse Research: A South
African Journal 38; Pillay 2010 Stel LR 230 & De Freitas & Myburgh 2009
Journal for Christian Scholarship 61.
23 Op cit 149 D-F.
24 In this case, a woman’s late-term pregnancy was terminated as a result of
the infliction of violence against her body. As the law stands, there is no
criminal offence of third-party foetal violence that results in the termination
of a pregnancy. See Pickles “The introduction of a statutory crime to
address third-party foetal violence” 2011 THRHR 546.
25 151 I.
26 Du Plessis 2013 Stel LR 73 74-75.
27 Ibid.
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issues involving the unborn.28 The core element of her argument is
protection of the unborn “irrespective and independent of its location or
relationship to the mother”.29
Kruuse, also expressing dissatisfaction with the outcome in Mshumpa,
rejects the single-entity approach and calls for the introduction of the
crime of feticide, being a crime that can be perpetrated against the
unborn only.30 This approach is justified on the grounds that the unborn
are something distinct from the pregnant women who carry them, and
that the value of human dignity, symbolising inherent human worth,
warrants this approach.31 In this respect, Kruuse states:32
The issue here is that, despite the ‘me-but-not-me’ image … the fetus is a
distinct organism from the mother and cannot be treated as a bit of human
tissue of the mother comparable to her kidney, one of her appendages or her
appendix. It is a separate living organism, whose destruction is something to
be regretted in itself regardless of what has happened to the mother carrying
it.
Turning to private law, in the context of termination of pregnancy, De
Freitas and Myburgh argue for the legal protection of the unborn from
“abortion”.33 They advocate a non-rights approach, thereby asserting
that the right-to-life argument is not necessary when seeking to develop
grounds to justify legal protection of the unborn from the women who
carry them.34 The authors unequivocally draw on the separate-entities
approach by using science to demonstrate that the unborn are more than
mere maternal “tissue” and embody a distinct human life which has
independent value, characteristics that are present from the moment of
conception.35 Throughout, they refrain from making any reference to or
engaging in a discussion that recognises the unborn in relation to the
pregnant women who carry them.
The separate-entities approach also presents itself in the context of
medical treatment of pregnant women, specifically concerning
contemporaneous or advanced refusal of medical treatment.36 Jordaan
considers the legal status of advanced medical directives and
28 Du Plessis 2013 Stel LR 76, 87-90.
29 Idem 77.
30 Kruuse 2009 THRHR 126.
31 Kruuse 2009 THRHR 134-136.
32 Ibid.
33 De Freitas & Myburgh 2009 Journal for Christian Scholarship 61.
34 Idem 65-70.
35 Idem 74-81.
36 Advanced refusals to submit to life-sustaining medical treatment can take
the form of a living will where a person expresses their wishes concerning
future medical treatment. This document will then be considered in cases
where medical treatment is necessary, but the patient is unable to
communicate his or her preferences regarding the impending medical
treatment. Advanced directives are helpful in cases where patients are in a
persistent vegetative state. For more on this, and on the current legal status
of living wills, see Carstens & Pearmain Foundational Principles of South
African Medical Law (2007) 208-210.
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convincingly argues that the right to make a decision to refuse medical
treatment is a constitutionally informed right.37 She therefore argues for
the legal recognition of advanced directives on the same grounds, since
the same constitutional principles are at play.38 In this context, Jordaan
approvingly refers to the situation in other jurisdictions and states: 39
[T]he ‘potential interests’ of the foetus to be born alive should be considered
before giving effect to the wishes of a pregnant patient to refuse medical
treatment, irrespective of whether such wishes were expressed in a
contemporaneous decision by a competent patient or at a previous stage in
an advanced directive.
In all the examples considered thus far there has been a call for direct
and individual protection of the unborn, but without going so far as
founding this call on the rights of the unborn or by extending legal
subjectivity. However, there are two examples where foetal individuation
has led to the call for the extension of rights to the unborn. As will be
discussed below, one of these examples advocates for the extension of
personhood, and therefore for the protection of the unborn as legal
persons.
3 2 Separate-entities Approach as a Basis for Personhood
In the context of criminal law, Ovens calls for the protection of the
unborn from drug-dependent pregnant women by extending the
definition of child abuse to include “damage” caused to the unborn in the
case of the prenatal use of drugs by pregnant women.40 Ovens’ approach
can be interpreted as bestowing on the unborn an enforceable right, as
against the pregnant women carrying them, to be born in a healthy
(specifically, non-drug exposed) condition. Where this right is not
respected, Ovens proposes that the women concerned be held criminally
liable, since their conduct would amount to child abuse.41 Ovens’ work
derives from a criminological perspective and she therefore engages with
the legal meaning of rights. She only briefly mentions applicable legal
principles and it is therefore not clear whether her intention is to extend
personhood and advocate for foetal rights generally. While Ovens does
use the term “rights” in respect of the unborn, it is not obviously clear
whether she is using that term in a technical legal sense.
Pillay argues that advances in medical science and technology have
rendered the born-alive rule redundant, in that these advances prove the
presence of life before birth.42 The author maintains that the concept of
personhood should adequately reflect medical knowledge of prenatal life
37 Jordaan 2011 44(1) De Jure 32.
38 Ibid.
39 Idem 44.
40 Ovens 2010 Child Abuse Research: A South African Journal 38.
41 Idem 45-46.
42 Pillay 2010 Stel LR 230-236.
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and, in so doing, include viable foetuses within its conceptual
framework.43 Pillay’s argument is as follows:44
In the abortion context, the attribution of foetal rights would constitute a
radical departure from the prevailing legal position which focuses solely on
the rights of pregnant women. As this unequal power relationship is
challenged, both the judiciary and the medical profession will have the
opportunity to adopt a more transparent, principled and balanced approach
in resolving maternal-foetal conflicts. In the non-abortion context relating to
third party criminal acts directed against pregnant women, the attribution of
foetal rights would give expression to the legal convictions of the community
which demand separate protection of the foetus through laws proscribing
murder and assault of the foetus. 
All the authors considered here, in respect of quasi-legal subjectivity
and personhood, adopt an approach to pregnancy that clearly follows the
separate-entities approach, thereby highlighting a trend towards
preferring this approach to the single-entity approach. Each example
individuates the unborn from the pregnant women carrying them,
assigns independent value in their separateness and, from there,
proceeds to justify individualised, foetal-specific legal protection to the
exclusion of pregnant women. A consequence of this approach is that
women are side-lined or turned into obscure non-entities. In doing so, all
the authors fail to understand women as an indispensable element for
prenatal existence and, ultimately, the reality of pregnancy as
embodying connection is wholly ignored.
4 Personhood as Offering Sufficient Protection 
for the Unborn: An Examination of Thomson’s 
“Defense of Abortion”
Clearly, there are varying degrees of consequence stemming from the
application of the separate-entities approach to pregnancy, the more
extreme being the extension of personhood and foetal rights and the less
extreme being merely developing a quasi-legal subject. While there is
concern with the general application of the separate-entities approach to
pregnancy, the more pressing issue is to consider whether employing the
separate-entities approach as a ground for foetal rights in fact protects
the unborn and gives it legal leverage over third parties, specifically
pregnant women.45 Further, it needs to be considered whether giving
heed46 to this suggested approach quashes “maternal–foetal conflicts”
and simplifies the issue of pregnancy under South African law generally.
43 Idem 236.
44 Idem 236-237. Footnotes omitted from the quotation.
45 As envisaged by Pillay 2010 Stel LR 230 and possibly by Ovens 2010 Child
Abuse Research: A South African Journal 38.
46 It must be noted that the phrase “giving heed” is used because, in Christian
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Concerning the notion of rights providing legal leverage for the
unborn, both Kruuse and McCreath J adopt the stance that granting rights
to the unborn will certainly offer the unborn protection, particularly
against unfavourable maternal conduct.47 In Christian Lawyers (1998)
per McCreath J, it was found that if the right to life in section 11 of the
Constitution were to be interpreted as applying to foetuses, foetuses
would have separate claims to life and lawful termination of pregnancies
would ultimately constitute murder – even if the termination of
pregnancies were medically indicated to preserve the lives of the
pregnant women concerned.48 Kruuse adopts a more nuanced approach
and asserts that, if the unborn are vested with legal subjectivity and thus
the right to life, it would mean that the right to terminate a pregnancy
would be impossible to justify, except where the pregnant woman’s life
is in danger.49 Later, Kruuse explains that the unborn’s right to life is a
right that is not capable of being outweighed by a woman’s rights
generally, meaning that the unborn’s right to life will always take
preference over a woman’s rights, aside from her right to life.50 The
separate-entities approach, applied in this way, seems to create a
situation where Pillay’s “maternal–foetal conflicts” are done away with,
because the right to life will always hold more weight than rights vested
in others, including those of pregnant women, as emphasised by Kruuse
and McCreath J. Therefore, the positions of Pillay, Kruuse and McCreath
J all complement the premise that a rights-based approach could possibly
serve as a workable method for protection of the unborn. However,
further reflection on this issue reveals a different perspective.
4 1 Thomson’s “Defense of Abortion” and Supporting 
South African Principles
Thomson51 offers a thought-provoking, if extreme, counter-argument to
46 Lawyers of SA v Minister of Health 1998 4 SA 1113 (T) (Christian Lawyers
(1998)), the separate-entities approach was unequivocally rejected when
the court found that the provisions of the Constitution did not apply to the
unborn.
47 Although it must be noted that both suggest not taking a rights-based
approach. See respectively Kruuse 2009 THRHR 133-135 and Christian
Lawyers 1998 1122 I-1123 C.
48 1122 I. Here, the court understood that, where a foetus is granted rights, it
could use those rights as a means to protect itself from termination of
pregnancy for any reason whatsoever. However, it must be recognised that
this position is unfounded, since principles of private defence (if a fatal
pregnancy is construed as an attack on a woman’s body) or necessity
justify the termination of a pregnancy in cases where continued pregnancy
poses a threat to a woman’s life. See Snyman Criminal Law (2009) 103-123
for a detailed discussion of private defence and necessity as grounds of
justification.
49 Kruuse 2009 THRHR 133.
50 Idem 135.
51 Thomson “A defense of abortion” 1971 Philosophy & Public Affairs 47.
While this article does not focus on justifying termination of pregnancies,
Thomson’s argument transcends the abortion debate and has application
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the above. Her work is so well known52 that it is not clear why her
publication has not been considered by those contemplating the
consequences of foetal rights.53 Thomson uses the example of waking up
to find that a violinist has been attached to your body in order to gain the
benefit of the function of your kidneys, and this attachment was
necessary for purposes of keeping the violinist alive. The crux of the issue
is that the violinist was attached to your body without your consent.
Thompson’s entire article revolves round this hypothetical anecdote and
she raises challenging questions as to whether anything can be done to
remove the attachment, even though removal would result in the
violinist’s death.
In this context, Thomson goes on to suggest that we imagine the
unborn as legal persons with the right to life, like the violinist, and further
suggests that, generally, the right to life includes the right to be given at
least the bare minimum that one needs for continued life.54 She then
poses the following question: What would the situation be where the bare
minimum that one needs to sustain life turns out to be something that
one does not have a right to?55
This question becomes relevant when, for purposes of sustaining life,
one needs the continued use of another’s body. The problem is that the
mere presence of need does not create an enforceable right against
another. Thomson contends that:56
… nobody has the right to use your kidneys unless you give him such a right;
and nobody has the right against you that you shall give him this right – if you
do allow him to go on using your kidneys, this is a kindness on your part, and
51 in any argument that attempts to accord rights to the unborn. This will
become apparent as the argument against the separate-entities approach
develops.
52 According to Google Scholar, and as at 20 Dec 2013, Thomson’s article had
been cited 1 119 times, and her book of the same title had been cited 67
times. See http://scholar.google.co.za/scholar?hl=en&q=Thomson+%22&
bntG=&as_sdtp (accessed 2013-12-20). Also see Kaczor The Ethics of
Abortion: Women’s Rights, Human Life, and the Question of Justice (2010) 145
who cites Thomson’s article as “the most famous article ever written about
the subject of abortion”. This is not to say that her work is unquestionably
accepted, for instance see Boonin A Defense of Abortion (2003) 133-276.
Boonin, while defending Thomson’s position, cites and discusses sixteen
different objections to Thomson’s argument. There are sure to be more
though.
53 The only authors cited in this article who refer to Thomson are De Freitas &
Myburgh 2009 Journal for Christian Scholarship 69-70 and Du Plessis 2013
Stel LR 88 – although these authors only cite authority that takes a stand
against Thomson’s position. The authors are in opposition to Thomson,
because they are attempting to justify protection of the unborn without
adopting a rights approach. Their approach could possibly have been
motivated by Thomson’s convincing argument that a rights approach may
be legally problematic and overly complex for anyone seeking to protect
the unborn on that basis.
54 Thomson 1971 Philosophy & Public Affairs 55.
55 Ibid.
56 1971 Philosophy & Public Affairs 55.
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not something he can claim from you as his due. Nor has he any right against
anybody else that they should give him continued use of your kidneys.
Ultimately, Thomson’s argument is that having the right to life does
not guarantee the use of that right.57 Where right of use is provided, it is
done because one is a “good Samaritan”.58 She views continued
pregnancy as a case of women acting as good Samaritans, in that there
is no legal obligation on them to make the sacrifices that are necessary
in order for the unborn to sustain prenatal life.59 In this respect,
Thomson questions whether engaging in voluntary sexual intercourse is
an indication of consent to a resulting pregnancy, thus giving rise to an
obligation, and she answers this in the negative.60 She convincingly
states:61
If the room is stuffy, and I therefore open a window to air it, and a burglar
climbs in, it would be absurd to say, ‘Ah, now he can stay, she’s given him a
right to the use of her house – for she is partially responsible for his presence
there, having voluntarily done what enabled him to get in, in full knowledge
that there are such things as burglars, and that burglars burgle.
Similarly, Karnein argues that, although women may be partly
responsible for conception, given that contraception is readily available
in this day and age, there is a limit to the amount of responsibility that
can accrue for something that women would have to go out of their way
to prevent, especially if what is being prevented is a natural process of
reproduction.62 She explains:63
[W]hile persons can be asked to make significant sacrifices to save those they
have deliberately pushed into the water, women cannot be asked to provide a
substantial amount of assistance to someone who came into existence
because they did not prevent a ‘natural’ process from occurring.
Thomson’s argument holds true in South Africa and is of particular
importance in the context where personhood is extended to the unborn.
There is no known South African case law or legislation that compels
another to forsake their bodies, or portions thereof, in order for another
to sustain his or her life. Labuschagne,64 drawing from laws regulating
donation,65 argues that, generally, no one has a claim to another’s body
without that person’s informed consent, and she demonstrates this to be
57 56.
58 Generally, Thomson’s argument is cited as the “Good Samaritan
Argument”: see Boonin 133.
59 Thomson 1971 Philosophy & Public Affairs 63.
60 Idem 57-58.
61 Idem 58-59.
62 Karnein A Theory of Unborn Life: From Aabortion to Genetic Manipulation
(2012) 24.
63 Ibid.
64 Pickles & Labuschagne supra. The argument presented here is
Labuschagne’s portion of the paper that she researched and later
presented.
65 Specifically, the National Health Act 61 of 2003, and case law and common
law principles relevant to informed consent.
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a well-established principle under South African law. On that note,
Labuschagne warns that this principle acts to the detriment of any aims
to protect the unborn as legal persons.
Labuschagne further contends that, since the unborn live off the
bodies of pregnant women and gain the benefit of pregnant women’s
bodily functions, a pregnancy can be understood as representing a
relationship of donation, because one person is using another person’s
body to sustain life.66 Accordingly, if the unborn were persons, they
would need pregnant women’s informed consent to continue
gestating.67 However, Labuschagne explains that the principle of
informed consent requires that, in order for the consent to be informed,
the person must have a knowledge and appreciation of what is being
consented to prior to the donation. Given that pregnancy is fairly
unpredictable in terms of what resulting procedures may be necessitated
by deciding to be pregnant, it is Labuschagne’s contention that no true
informed consent can ever actually be obtained. Where informed
consent is lacking, as would be the case for all pregnancies, even planned
ones, the person whose body is being used is essentially being
assaulted.68
Labuschagne thus affirms that no one can be compelled to make a
donation, even where it would amount to life-saving treatment.69 These
principles therefore support Thomson’s premise that continued gestation
is an act that only good Samaritans would perform, since, technically,
there is no obligation on them to make the sacrifices necessary for the
unborn to sustain life.
4 2 Implications of Foetal Individuation and the Extension 
of Rights Based on the Separate-entities Approach
The separate-entities approach, despite going so far as to create the
foundation for foetal rights, does not in fact provide the intended
protection. If applied in a strict, uncompromising sense, it actually serves
as a ground to justify the termination of pregnancies for reasons beyond
the threat to life of pregnant women.70 Terminations could take place at
any time during gestation, because there is absolutely no obligation on
anyone to be a good Samaritan for any designated period of time.
66 See s56 of the National Health Act, which makes provision for the donation
and use of living persons’ tissue, being blood, blood products and gametes.
67 As required in terms of ss6 & 7, read together with ss55 & 66 of the
National Health Act.
68 For the consequences of not having obtained informed consent, see
Carstens & Pearmain 890-891.
69 Here, Labuschagne refers to Palmer v Palmer 1955 3 SA 56 (O); S v Goliath
1972 3 All SA 69 (A); Castell v de Greef 1994 4 SA 408 (C).
70 Thomson does not adopt such an extreme approach, but tones down her
argument by referring to and considering issues such as “justifiable killing”.
Moreover, she recognises that, at times, there are things that one “ought to
do” or that some things are “morally unacceptable”.
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It is submitted that this approach can be taken to absolute extremes.
For instance, where women permit the continued pregnancy, out of
“kindness”, there is no known authority in law that would compel a
woman to conduct herself in a way that would increase the quality of her
kind act. In other words, the right to life may not guarantee that, when
kindness prevails, one will have an enforceable authority pertaining to
the quality of that kindness. Placing this in the context of pregnancy, the
unborn will not have a right to dictate the condition in which the body is
kept. These assertions speak specifically to concerns that substance
abuse during pregnancy constitutes child abuse. Should a ground be
developed to provide the unborn with an enforceable claim to optimal
quality of the kindness it receives, another extreme position can be
taken, namely that, where a charge of child abuse looms as a result of
substance abuse while pregnant, pregnant women could very simply
terminate their pregnancies.
Ultimately, this approach creates the space to voluntarily terminate
viable but pre-term pregnancies, and this cannot be seen as serving
important developmental needs of foetuses. Pre-term deliveries pose a
number of health issues, and long-term medical and social risks,71 and
can hardly be seen as a positive outcome associated with foetal rights.
The potential outcomes of this approach are rather offensive. A
separate-entities approach to pregnancy blatantly introduces conflicts
and creates an environment for head-on adversarialism between
pregnant women and their foetuses and, ultimately, strikes at the core of
the relationship that pregnancy represents. Further, this stance towards
pregnancy does not foster optimal health for the foetus.
71 For instance, see Pignotti & Donzelli “Perinatal care at the threshold of
viability: An international comparison of practical guidelines for the
treatment of extremely preterm births” 2008 Pediatrics 193. The authors
point out that extremely premature neonates will usually die during or very
soon after birth and, for those who do survive, childhood death is very
likely. Also see Moster, Lie & Markestad “Long-term medical and social
consequences of preterm birth” 2008 New England Journal of Medicine 262.
If premature neonates survive, the authors highlight that medical and social
disabilities increase in relation to neonates’ decreasing gestational age at
birth. In the long term, premature infants are likely to progress through
adulthood suffering medical disabilities (being cerebral palsy, mental
retardation or other neurological disorders), behavioural and psychological
problems (being autism and schizophrenia), and may experience learning
disabilities.
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5 Rejecting the Single-entity and Separate-
entities Approaches: Pregnancy as a Relational 
Construction and the Not-One-But-Not-Two 
Approach
Seymour,72 and all the other South African authors referred to in this
article, correctly reject the single-entity approach as irreconcilable with
scientific fact. The single-entity approach denies the distinctive
existence, the “extra-ness”, that the foetus embodies during a continued
pregnancy. The unborn are biologically and genetically distinct from the
pregnant women who carry them, and women are “whole” with or
without the presence of prenatal life.73 In this respect, the current South
African approach to pregnancy is flawed, and the existence of the foetus
cannot continue to be overlooked for much longer.
Flaws inherent in the single-entity approach must be understood
beyond what science tells us. Seymour explains that some argue for the
retention of this approach because it secures female autonomy during
pregnancy, that is, if the foetus is considered as merely constituting part
of a body, women will still enjoy the space for freedom of choice – in
other words, whether or not to terminate the pregnancy.74 However, this
is a very superficial and one-sided understanding of female autonomy
during pregnancy.
Female autonomy must also recognise women’s vested interests in
their unborn. Therefore, female autonomy must be understood as
including the decision to continue with a pregnancy, as well as decisions
on how to progress through pregnancy. This manifestation of autonomy
must be protected in law in order for it to have any meaningful effect for
women who want children. Consequently, the single-entity approach
only speaks to one side of female autonomy and fails to assist those
women who plan to continue with their pregnancies and to adequately
protect such decisions. For instance, Seymour refers to an example
where a pregnant woman is unlawfully attacked and, as a result
miscarries,75 a situation similar to that in Mshumpa. Here, the single-
entity approach prevents the law from responding to her loss of a
72 Seymour 191.
73 Ibid. Seymour refers to, and quotes from, MacKinnon’s work: See
MacKinnon “Reflections on sex equality under law” 1991 Yale LJ 1281,
1313-1316. MacKinnon at 1314, also rejects the separate-entities approach
to pregnancy under the law and describes the foetus as a separate
organism comparable to a parasite. However, the foetus’s dependence does
not make it a body-part belonging to the pregnant woman.
74 Seymour 193.
75 193-194.
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pregnancy that she had an interest in, because the foetus is not
recognised in law.76
Ultimately, the single-entity approach fails not only to speak to
scientific fact, but also to comprehensively engage female experiences
and expectations of pregnancy, feminine issues related to pregnancy
continuation, and the resulting consequences of pregnancy for
parenthood.
That said, South African authors referred to in this article go on to
suggest adopting the separate-entities approach to allow the law to be
true to scientific revelations about prenatal life.77 Yet, Seymour explains
that, while the single-entity approach forecloses the possibility for
intervention on behalf of the unborn, the separate-entities approach
invites intervention and conflict.78 However, it should be remembered
that the discussion of Thomson’s “good Samaritan” argument
demonstrated that the extent of conflict will obviously depend on
whether the separate-entities approach is adopted to justify personhood
before birth or whether it is used to develop a quasi-legal subject for the
unborn.79
Earlier in the article, it was established that the separate-entities
approach, which accords rights to the unborn, in fact fails to protect the
unborn.80 However, the attribution of quasi-legal subjectivity also fails
because it is founded on the separate-entities approach more generally.
The separate-entities approach strikes at the core of the embodied reality
of pregnancy. It denies pregnancy’s very nature, being one of
relationship and factual connectedness, by directly engaging with the
unborn through the application of legal principles. The central issue as
regards the separate-entities approach is that it almost completely
negates the significance of the existence of women.81 Women and their
bodies cannot be bypassed, ignored or made invisible: They are
76 Through the infliction of violence, a woman’s decision to have a child was
interfered with, but no one can be held accountable for that interference
because, prior to birth, the foetus does not exist. The same issue arises in
the case where, as a result of medical negligence, a woman who continues
with a pregnancy and intends to give birth to a live child, delivers a stillborn
child. The single-entity approach precludes any recourse, because the
foetus, as a non-entity, never acquired legal personality owing to medical
negligence preventing live birth. Also, if the existence of the unborn is
denied in law, it is not clear how pregnant women can claim extra medical
attention or state support that is needed in order to progress safely through
wanted pregnancies.
77 De Freitas & Myburgh 2009 Journal for Christian Scholarship 61; Kruuse
2009 THRHR 126; Ovens 2010 Child Abuse Research: A South African
Journal 38; Pillay 2010 Stel LR 230; Jordaan 2011 De Jure 32; Du Plessis
2013 Stel LR 73.
78 Seymour 200.
79 See para 4 supra.
80 Ibid.
81 Karpin “Legislating the female body: Reproductive technology and the
reconstructed woman” 1992 Colum J Gender & L 325-327.
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essentially a sine qua non for the existence of prenatal life. Seymour
further points out that the more the separate-entities approach
individuates the unborn, the less the individuality of women is
recognised.82
Thus, while science does demonstrate the unique genetic character of
the unborn, Karpin convincingly argues as follows:83
There is no scientifically verifiable ‘fact’ that designates woman and fetus as
separate. There are only scientific descriptions that hypothesize the notions of
separateness, and certain descriptions are being privileged over others. For
example, the scientific ‘fact’ that the fetus and mother are genetically
different does not answer the question of whether the description of them as
separate is appropriate.84
It is submitted that the separate-entities approach to pregnancy can
only ever be justified in the abstract and in the context of hypothetical
anecdotes. This is especially true where foetal separateness leads to
direct engagement with the unborn in the context of law, being direct
application of rights and legal doctrines or principles. Thomson’s
hypothetical application of rights to the unborn, while viewed as the
correct use of legal principles in the context of competing rights bearers,
must ultimately be rejected for its underlying reliance on the separate-
entities approach and thus for its failure to encompass a proper reflection
of pregnancy.85 The reality of pregnancy does not speak to an approach
based on separateness. One cannot ever, regardless of the designation of
separateness, directly engage with the unborn in any tangible way, since
the unborn exist in a factually non-permeable86 environment, that is,
within the body of a woman. It is this embodied connection that must be
acknowledged, since this connection absolutely prevents direct contact
82 Seymour 195.
83 Karpin 1992 Colum J Gender & L 326.
84 To emphasise this point, it is worthwhile referring to Herring & Chau “My
body, your body, our bodies” 2007 Medical LR 34, 45-47. The authors, in
debating whether one owns one’s body, turn to medical science to prove the
interconnection of bodies. In fact, they start off with pregnancy and define
it as a relationship of shared space and fluids. They justify their position by
referring to scientific studies pertaining to the development of the placenta
and its role in ensuring optimal foetal development through its connection
to the body of pregnant women.
85 After highlighting the weakness in the foetal rights arguments, Thomson
(1971) Philosophy & Public Affairs 58 suggests that we focus on the unique
dependency of the unborn on pregnant women, and view this dependency
as a source of a “special kind of responsibility” a pregnant woman will have
towards the unborn she carries. This responsibility is special because it is
not something that can be claimed by other independent persons. This
approach is founded on the relationship shared between the unborn and
pregnant women.
86 Karpin (1992) Colum J Gender & L 333 states that technology, for instance
ultrasonography, has led to the impression that the female body is
permeable and flexible to outside curiosities, and argues that pregnant
women are viewed as passive foetal containers in the sense that they are
denied the capacity to carry the unborn and determine their boundaries.
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or interaction between the unborn and others. Here, “others” must be
understood to include third parties, such as the outside community and
the medical profession, and the law with its legal principles.
Rejecting both the single-entity and separate-entities approaches does
not leave the issue of pregnancy under the law unresolved. Seymour
suggests that there is a third approach that can be adopted when
confronting pregnancy in law, namely the not one/not two approach.87
This approach to pregnancy is seen to lie between the two extremes of
the single-entity and the separate-entities approaches to pregnancy, thus
offering a middle ground.88 The not one/not two approach is defined as
a female view of pregnancy.89 MacKinnon provides a description of the
unborn from a female perspective that validates this approach:90
More than a body part but less than a person, where it is, is largely what it is.
From the standpoint of pregnant women, it is both me and not me. It ‘is’ the
pregnant woman, in the sense that it is in her and of her and is hers more
than anyone’s. It is ‘not her’ in the sense that she is not all that is there. In a
legal system that views the individual as a unitary self, and that self as a
bundle of rights, it is no wonder that the pregnant woman has eluded legal
grasp, and her fetus with her.91
The focus on the relationship allows for the recognition of the
following elements as stemming from the existence of a pregnancy:
United needs; interconnectedness; mutuality; and reciprocity.92
Essentially, it advocates a view and embeds understanding that pregnant
women and foetuses cannot be viewed in isolation. The not one/not two
approach allows a foetus to be recognised as a distinct entity, but it also
expresses an unequivocal reminder of the relationship shared between a
86 She understands this to be a technocultural phenomenon based on
ultrasonography, with viewers of prenatal ultrasound scans coming to
(mistakenly) understand the uterus as permeable as a result of being able to
view the unborn prior to birth.
87 Seymour 199. Also see, generally, Karpin 1992 Colum J Gender & L 325.
88 Seymour 190, 202.
89 Seymour 199; MacKinnon 1991 Yale LJ 1281, 1309, 1313-1314. MacKinnon
explains that the legal system has failed to adequately conceptualise
pregnancy and the relationship between pregnant women and foetuses,
because the interests, perceptions and experiences that have shaped the
law on this topic are those of men and development has occurred to the
exclusion of women. This is problematic, because pregnancy is a female
experience, thus resulting in the development of principles from a
disadvantaged outsider perspective.
90 MacKinnon 1991 Yale LJ 1316. Footnotes omitted from the quotation.
91 Lupton’s studies support MacKinnon’s position: See Lupton 53-56. Lupton
recognises that some women do understand their pregnancies as housing a
separate individual. However, even within the perception of foetal
individuation, all women understood the foetus to be in and somewhat part
of their bodies, and thus not completely apart from them.
92 Seymour 190.
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pregnant woman and her foetus.93 Therefore, this approach
acknowledges that foetuses have interests, but that these interests must
be promoted in a way that acknowledges women’s rights.94
In order to achieve the aim of advancing the unborn’s interests in such
a way that women’s rights are promoted, the not one/not two approach
to pregnancy is context-driven, meaning that the relationship between
pregnant women and foetuses must be understood in terms of the
context in which that relationship exists. It is only through the process of
including context that one can determine if intervention in pregnancy is
necessary and what the nature of such intervention should be. Where
legal intervention is found to be necessary, context would assist in
determining whether such an intervention would amount to an
acknowledgment or infringement of women’s rights.95
Seymour sees this approach as being flexible.96 Firstly, it
acknowledges value in the unborn, but denies them their separateness.97
Secondly, it enables women’s rights to be included and considered.98
Thirdly, it sets the scene for the protection of the unborn when their
interests are threatened by a third party, but may produce different
results when the interests of the unborn are threatened by the pregnant
women carrying them.99
On the issue of harm caused by pregnant women, Seymour argues
that this approach does not provide absolute legal immunity for pregnant
women.100 While the author goes on to assert that female autonomy
93 Idem 200. This approach echoes the principles of relational feminism, thus
supporting MacKinnon’s premise that the not one/not two approach is a
female perspective on pregnancy. Relational feminism understands
individuals as constituting an intricate web of relationships, all of which are
characterised by interdependence and mutuality. For more on the theory of
relational feminism, see Van Marle & Bonthuys “Feminist theories and
concepts” in Bonthuys & Albertyn (eds) Gender, Law and Justice (2007) 35-
37. For examples of the practical application of relational feminism, see
McConnell “Relational and liberal feminism: The ‘ethic of care’, fetal
personhood and autonomy” 1996 West Virginia LR 291; Ordolis “Maternal
substance abuse and the limits of the law: A relational challenge” 2008
Alberta LR 119; Laufer-Ukeles “Reproductive choices and informed consent:
Fetal interests, women’s identity, and relational autonomy” 2011 American
Journal of Law and Medicine 567. Also see Pickles S v Mshumpa: A Time for
Law Reform (LLM dissertation 2008 UP) 124-126, 133-134. It must be noted
that Pickles does not use the term “relational feminism”, but the adopted
approach certainly ties in with the concept of relational feminism in the
context of pregnancy.
94 Seymour 200.
95 Ibid.
96 Idem 201-202.
97 Idem 201.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Idem 202.
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plays a crucial role in determining their immunity,101 it is suggested that
absolute freedom during pregnancy may never be in place, because this
approach demands that the value of the unborn always play a part, not
the central part, but certainly an important contributory one, in
determining a way forward.
South Africa applies this approach in the context of the Choice on
Termination of Pregnancy Act.102 In Christian Lawyers (2005),103 while
dealing with the constitutionality of the Choice on Termination of
Pregnancy Act, the court found that the right to terminate a pregnancy is
not absolute and went on to acknowledge the state’s interest in
respecting reproductive decision-making processes. While recognising
the importance of women’s termination-of-pregnancy rights, the court
found that this right, like all constitutional rights, is subject to the
limitation clause.104 Focusing on state interest, Mojapelo J explicitly
recognised that “[t]he state has a legitimate role, in the protection of pre-
natal life as an important value in our society, to regulate and limit the
woman’s right to choose in that regard”.105 Since the right to terminate
a pregnancy is a fundamental constitutional right, state regulation cannot
amount to an outright denial of the freedom to exercise the right.106
Thus, the limitation must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom as
required in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.107
This case is squarely aligned with the not one/not two approach to
pregnancy, because the value in prenatal life is acknowledged, indicating
that pregnancy embodies more than one entity. However, the
acknowledgement does not go so far as to confer on the unborn an
101 Seymour’s discussion of autonomy (in the context of Canada and the USA)
goes beyond the scope of this article. Briefly, he suggests that women will
benefit from immunity where harm caused to the unborn is a result of
women exercising their right to withhold consent to invasive bodily
infringements. However, he refrains from answering the question as to
whether a woman can be held legally accountable where harm is caused to
the unborn by the woman engaging in harmful conduct such as drug abuse
or alcoholism.
102 92 of 1996.
103 2005 1 SA 509 (T).
104 527D.
105 527D.
106 527E.
107 527E. Christian Lawyers (2005) can be distinguished from S v Mshumpa’s
application of the not one/not two approach, in that Froneman J used the
relationship between pregnant women and foetuses as a means to deny
acting on the value of the unborn. Froneman J found that, since the unborn
are uniquely connected to the pregnant women carrying them, addressing
the harm caused to pregnant women will effectively address the harm
caused to the unborn as well; thus there is no need to give legal credence to
prenatal life. In contrast, in Christian Lawyers (2005), Mojapelo J used the
not one/not two approach to recognise the value of the unborn and
specifically act on that value, which is achieved in the judge’s explanation
as to why the right to terminate a pregnancy can be legitimately regulated
and limited as pregnancies progress.
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entirely separate status with enforceable rights. Rather, this judicial
acknowledgement views the unborn in relation to pregnant women and
their existing rights. Christian Lawyers (2005) can also be distinguished
from the cases discussed under the single-entity approach,108 in that the
court not only acknowledged the existence of prenatal life, but also
attached value thereto, which value is understood to demand state action
for the benefit of the unborn in a qualified way that is respectful of
women’s rights. Finally, Christian Lawyers (2005) demonstrates that the
not one/not two approach has every expectation of surviving
constitutional muster.
6 Concluding remarks
This article has shown that neither the single-entity nor the separate-
entities approaches adequately recognise or engage the connected
nature of pregnancy as reflected on by MacKinnon and Lupton. The
single-entity approach makes non-entities of the unborn and fails to give
effective legal recognition to broader constructs of female reproductive
autonomy. Application of the separate-entities approach to pregnancy
goes on to make almost obscure non-entities of pregnant women and,
where they are recognised, it is on a limited basis and focuses mainly on
them as adversarial participants in a pregnancy. Furthermore, neither
approach gives effective legal recognition to the values and interests of
the unborn. It is therefore concluded that both approaches to pregnancy
fail as a result of the very fact that each unsuccessfully grasps the lived
experiences of pregnancy.
It is therefore proposed that, when considering pregnancy under the
law, the value of the unborn must be recognised, but understood in
relation to pregnant women. Understanding the togetherness that
pregnancy represents allows the law to recognise both entities that
constitute the pregnancy. Any calls for law reform regarding pregnancy,
pregnant women or the unborn may essentially fail because their
foundational approaches tend to exclude one of the constituent “parties”
that forms a pregnancy. Without women, no pregnancies would exist –
and the same can be said of the unborn.
The not one/not two approach employs the embodied connectedness
of pregnancy as a point of departure, and seeks to advance an inclusive
approach to issues stemming from pregnancy. It uses the pregnancy
relationship and its context as an interpretative tool in determining a way
forward. While this approach may not always place the unborn’s
interests above those of the pregnant women carrying them, it does
require that their interests be considered with reference to the dictates of
context. The very fact that South Africa already has the makings of this
approach in the judicial interpretation in Christian Lawyers (2005) of the
Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act speaks volumes regarding its
108 Op cit.
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appropriateness and constitutional soundness. It is recommended that
the not one/not two approach should therefore receive proper
consideration henceforth and, where reform is recommended, those
recommendations should be tested against the demands of this
approach.
